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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This matter involves the final decision and order of the Industrial Commission denying a
petition for Workers' Compensation benefits. As a result, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issues raised in this appeal arose out of the Industrial Commission's (hereinafter
"Commission" or "Industrial Commission") denial of Workers' Compensation benefits,
particularly those related to a permanent and total disability of the petitioner Robert Smith
(hereinafter "Mr. Smith" or "Applicant"). The Industrial Commission's action was precipitated
by a hearing before an administrative law judge (R.182), as well as briefing to the Industrial
Commission (R. 105-128). Both the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Administrative
Law Judge and the Industrial Commission Order are attached as Addenda One and Two.
Petitioner's petition for review is attached as Addendum Three. Accordingly, this issue has been
preserved for appeal.
Issue Presented: Whether Robert Smith failed to make out a prima facie case of
permanent total disability, including a showing of medical causation.
Standard of Review: The Industrial Commission's findings of fact regarding medical
causation will be sustained only if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record. Willardson v. Industrial Comm.. 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), rev'd
on other grounds, 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995).

1

Issue for Review: Whether the Industrial Commission should have used the sequential
decision-making analysis of the Social Security Administration in its determination of the
issues.
Standard of Review: Conclusions of the Commission as to general questions of law,
such as what law to apply, are reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no deference
given to the Commission. Willardson v. Industrial Comm.. 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).rev'd on other grounds. 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995). The factors to be considered by
administrative tribunals are questions of law. Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission. 885
P.2d 759, 770 (Utah 1994).
Issue for Review: Whether the Industrial Commission improperly relied upon the
medical panel's determination of Mr. Smith's disability status.
Standard of Review: The Commission's interpretation of the Workers' Compensation
Act is reviewed for correctness, although the Industrial Commission has discretion to apply its
factual findings to the law, and the Commission's application will not be disturbed unless its
interpretation exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial
Comm.. 901 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The factors to be considered by administrative
tribunals are questions of law. Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm., 885 P.2d 759, 770 (Utah
1994).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUES, AND RULES
This matter involves the interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act, specifically
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1992)1 and Utah Administrative Code R490-1-17, which have been
reproduced in their entirety in Addendum Four.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual History: The present case involves an application for benefits for permanent
total disability brought by Robert Smith arising out of an accident which occurred at the work
site of his employer, Mity Lite. On May 23,1990, Robert Smith, in the course of his work at
Mity Lite, was lifting pallets with the aid of a co-employee. Mr. Smith's supervisor told the coemployee he was needed elsewhere and required Mr. Smith to continue lifting the pallets
himself. When Mr. Smith tried to lift a heavy pallet by himself he injured his back. (R. 195).
Following the injury, Mr. Smith was unable to work and drove himself to the hospital a few
hours later. (R. 124).
Mr. Smith subsequently underwent three surgeries, received spinal injections, and has
undergone extensive physical therapy to alleviate the pain in his lower back. (R. 195). Mr.
Smith is 45 years old and prior to May 23,1990, Mr. Smith had never before been treated by a
health care professional for back problems. (R. 224).
Notwithstanding Mr. Smith's medical treatments, he has been unable to alleviate the
significant pain since the accident andfindsit necessary to treat his pain with morphine every

*A11 citations to the Utah Code are those provisions which were in effect at the time of the
initial injury. In Workers' Compensation cases the law existing at the time of injury is applied.
Wicat Systems v. Pellegrini. 771 P.2d 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moore v. American Coal Co..
737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987).
3

few hours. (R. 196). Mr. Smith is unable to sit for any substantial period of time. When he is
required to travel, he must lie down in the back of his van and be driven to his destination. (R.
197).
Mr. Smith is also severely restricted in his ability to walk. He is able to walk across the
room, but he cannot walk around the block. (R. 198). At the time of his hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge on May 16,1994, Mr. Smith stated that the level of pain which makes
it impossible to sit and walk a substantial distance has persisted for several years. (R. 199).
Mr. Smith's lifetime work experience has been limited to general labor, e.g. heavy lifting,
digging ditches, and stacking heavy materials. He has no formal education past the fifth grade.2
(R. 200). He cannot read a newspaper and is unable to complete an employment application
without the help of his wife. Mr. Smith's mathematical skills are so limited that he is unable to
balance a checkbook. (R. 201).
Since Mr. Smith's accident at Mity Lite he has not been employed. (R. 201). Social
Security Disability benefits were granted by the Social Security Administration as of the date of
his accident based on a finding that he has been unable to work due to a herniated disc with
peridural adhesions. (R. 55).
Procedural History: Mr. Smith made a claim with the Industrial Commission for
permanent total disability. As part of the claims process, the Administrative Law Judge (ALT)
appointed a medical panel to consider Mr. Smith's claims. The medical panel found that Mr.
Smith suffers from a 13% permanent impairment to his low back, two-thirds of which is

2

Mity Lite contended at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge that Mr. Smith
may have gone as far as the seventh grade.
4

attributable to the industrial accident. He also suffers from a seven percent impairment due to a
pre-existing shoulder injury, and a five percent impairment due to his psychiatric status. (R. 75).
However, the medical panel found that the shoulder impairment had no effect on Mr. Smith's
ability to work. (R. 75).
Based on these findings, the ALJ found adequate medical causation to grant Robert Smith
temporary total disability benefits for the period of May 23,1990 through October 1,1992, but
denied Mr. Smith's claim for permanent total disability benefits because of insufficient evidence
of medical causation. (R. 102). The Industrial Commission (Commission) adopted the findings
of the medical panel and the Administrative Law Judge and denied Mr. Smith's application for
benefits, with the exception of Commissioner Carlson who dissented. (R. 126).
Commissioner Carlson dissented on the basis that there was no dispute that Mr. Smith
had suffered an industrial accident which was the medical cause of his three subsequent surgeries
and unmanageable pain. Further, Commissioner Carlson stated that Mr. Smith's age, education,
and level of pain make it impossible him to perform the few unskilled light duty jobs he is
theoretically qualified to perform. Commissioner Carlson stated:
In my view, Mr. Smith's injury at work unleashed a cascade of events that has left him
permanently and totally disabled. This opinion is supported by the fact the Mr. Smith has
been awarded Social Security Disability benefits for essentially the same injuries that are
at issue in his Workers' Compensation case.
(R. 127). A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the applicant followed, which motion was
expressly denied for the reasons stated in the original Commission Order. (R. 146). Mr. Smith
now appeals the decision of the Industrial Commission denying him permanent total disability
compensation.
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EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION
(MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE)
The Commission's denial of permanent total disability rested upon a finding of no
medical causation. After adopting the medical panel's report, the Commission stated:3
In considering the issue of medical causation, the Industrial Commission notes
that the medical panel has found Mr. Smith to suffer from a 13% whole person
impairment of his lower back, of which two-thirds is due to his industrial injury. The
foregoing impairment is not inconsequential. However, the medical panel and other
physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent pattern of non-industrial
depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependancy, personality disorder and
depression which are diagnosed as the cause of his inability to return to work. For
example, after having identified Mr. Smith's industrial and nonindustrial impairments,
the medical panel concluded that with adequate conditioning, Mr. Smith can perform
light duty work. As noted at page five of the ALJ's decision, "Mr. Smith has
demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern of inconsistencies. A large portion of his
disability is not caused by objective factors. He has a pattern of exaggerated physical
complaints."
Having considered the medical and other evidence regarding the relationship
between Mr. Smith's industrial accident and his now claimed permanent total disability,
the Industrial Commission concludes that Mr. Smith has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that his industrial accident is the medical cause of his now
claimed permanent total disability.

(R. 125-26). In support for this conclusion of law which is actually a finding of fact applicant
has marshaled the following evidence.4

3

Although the Administrative Law Judge initially heard the evidence in this matter, as the
Commission is the ultimate fact finder, the applicant is attacking solely the Commission's
findings. Hoskings. Industrial Comm.. 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct App. 1996). Of course, the
Commission relied to a large extent on the facts as found by the Administrative Law Judge, and
so the findings by the judge must be considered in evaluating the Commission's conclusions.
4

Applicant assumes that the Industrial Commission do not consider Mr. Smith's
asymptomatic back condition in its determination both because the preexisting spinal disc
degeneration is not mentioned in the aforementioned conclusion and also because such
consideration would be contrary to law. Crossland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528 (Utah Ct.
6

The findings of non-industrial depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency
and personality disorder are mainly conclusions arrived at by the medical panel based upon the
conclusions of Dr. David O. McCann, a psychiatrist. See Dr. McCann's Conclusions R. 448-51.
Mr. Smith was also diagnosed as being depressed by Dr. Robert Burgoyne. (R. 79). The medical
panel must have based its conclusions as to lower back impairment on the opinion of other
physicians because the medical panel did not consider its measurements of Mr. Smith's
lumbosacral spine to be valid due to Mr. Smith's expressions of pain. (R. 73). Dr. Nathaniel
Nord, who conducted an independent medical examination at the behest of the Fund, wrote that
as of January 1994 Mr. Smith relied upon the use of a walker "which appeared not be [sic]
required by any evident gait abnormality." (R. 245). In April of 1993, Dr. Nord wrote that his
examination "revealed a middle-aged man with marked mannerisms of pain behavior. While a
walker was pushed ahead of him, weight bearing on the unit was minimal, and Mr. Smith
appeared to walkfreely,without antalgic pattern." (R. 250). Dr. Nord noted further, "Although
Mr. Smith cautiously lowered himself to the examination table, when he subsequently was asked
to arise from the table he did not use a logrolling technique, but merely pushed himself
upwards." (R. 250-51).
All medical providers concur that Mr. Smith suffered from pre-existing degenerative disc
disease to his back, although there is no evidence whatsoever of that condition being

App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)("Utah Courts have followed the well established
common law rule that when an industrial accident lights up or aggravates a pre-existing
deficiency or disease, the resulting disability is compensable as long as the industrial accident
was the medical and legal cause of the injury.").
7

symptomatic in any way. The diagnostic imaging studies done of Mr. Smith did show the
degenerative disc disease. (R. 422-428). Only Dr. McCann made a definitive finding as to
opiate dependancy, although Dr. Nord referred Mr. Smith for "psychologic assistance and
withdrawal from the addictive properties of morphine sulfate." (R. 247). Dr. McCann also
identifies as the genesis of his finding of somatoform pain disorder the suggestion of Dr. College
at the Cottonwood Spine Institute of similar findings. (R. 449). The applicant was unable to find
any physician other than David McCann who diagnosed Mr. Smith with personality disorder.
As to Mr. Smith's inability to work, Dr. Nord did state:
[T]he evident physical impairment does not prevent Mr. Smithfromreturning to any kind
of competitive employment.
(R.247). However, this statement was qualified in a subsequent letter wherein Dr. Nord stated:
"[W]e would judge Mr. Smith to have a light work capacity." (R. 248). The forgoing constitutes
the evidence marshaled in favor of the Industrial Commission's determination that medical
causation was not shown.
In contrast, the following evidence supports a finding that Mr. Smith's industrial accident
medically caused Mr. Smith's significant permanent impairment to his lower back which
precludes him from returning to his prior employment of manual labor which included heavy
lifting, standing, twisting, etc. All of Mr. Smith's treating physicians, as well as the independent
medical examiner Dr. Nord, concluded that Mr. Smith is permanently impaired. For example,
Dr. Nord found that Mr. Smith suffers from a 14% lumbar permanent impairment, only two
percent of which is attributable to pre-existing back degeneration. Dr. Nord notes:
The percentage of impairment attributable to the industrial injury of May 23,1991 is 12%
of the whole person.
8

(R. 246). Dr. Nord concluded that Mr. Smith's permanent impairment attributable to events
subsequent to the industrial injury is zero percent. Dr. Nord specifically noted:
The medical care received since May 23,1990 was necessitated by the industrial accident
of that date.
This medical care presumably would include the prescription of opiate drugs which the medical
panel nowfindsto be a component of Mr. Smith's disability. Dr. Nord wrote: "Should it be
possible for Mr. Smith to return to the work force, the standard restrictions regarding repetitive
lifting, bending, and carrying, particularly of objects weighing in excess of 25 pound, would
apply." (R. 252). Dr. Nord had previously stated that future work "must preclude activities of
lifting greater than 35 pounds, repetitive stooping, bending, or twisting." (R. 260).
Prior to the industrial accident at issue, Mr. Smith had not suffered a work related injury.
(R. 223). Mr. Smith had never received medical treatment for a back condition prior to the
industrial accident at Mity-Lite. In fact Mr. Smith has never been to a doctor or chiropractor for
any type of back injury. (R. 224).
Dr. Adams, Mr. Smith's main treating physician, and the physician who performed the
surgeries on Mr. Smith, indicated that he would consider Mr. Smith to be 100% disabled. (R.
268). Dr. Adams performed three surgeries on Mr. Smith's back, and because of persistent pain,
prescribed the opiates to which Mr. Smith may now be addicted. As stated, there is no evidence
that Mr. Smith took opiates or drugs of any kind prior to his industrial accident. While all other
physicians examined Mr. Smith or viewed radiological images, Dr. Adams actually viewed the
area affected during surgery. In August of 1992 Dr. Adams reported:
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The bony prominences of S1.L5 and L4 were identified and dissected free of old
adhesions. The dura was found to be densely covered with at least 1/4 to lA inch of scar
tissue
(R. 355).
Dr. Adams states in a later report:
I . . . feel that the symptomatology was compatible with the findings. Epidural fibrosis
was the expected sequela following lumbar disc surgery. His scarring is excessive over
the normal amount. The patients present symptoms are completely compatible with the
current spinal imaging films. I do not believe Mr. Smith's behavior is extreme or out of
proportion to his pain and that the symptoms for the development of epidural fibrosis are
exactly compatible with his present complaint.
(R. 267). Dr. Adams then concluded:
Mr. Smith's problem is not medically stable but demonstrate[s] evidence of a constant
progressive deterioration. There has been a very serious emotional disability produced by
his constant pain. The estimation of his physical rating of 11% is completely out of line
and I feel strongly that Mr. Smith should be considered 100% permanently disabled.
It is not possible for Mr. Smith to return to any type of work whether sitting, standing [,
or] repetitive [actions]. There can be no climbing or lifting. The problem is that pain is
constantly distracting and the patient requires significant narcotics. This occasionally
obtunds his coordination and mental sensibility making him unfit for any type of
employment.
(R. 25). Because of the intense pain, Mr. Smith was placed on Morphine Sulfate in January of
1993 by Dr. Adams. (R. 27).
As stated, Mr. Smith is currently receiving Social Security disability benefits granted
upon the basis that Mr. Smith's sole disabling medical problem is a herniated disc with peridural
adhesions, as a result of the industrial accident of May 23,1990. (See Disability Determination
and Transmittal, R. 55). Radiologic studies confirmed "Epidural fibrosis at the L4-5 level which
could result in traction on the right 1-5 nerve root," as well as spondylosis, and a mild central disc
bulge at the L5-S1 level. (R. 95). Dr. Charles Smith who also saw Mr. Smith indicated that his
10

back problems are directly related to the industrial accident. (R. 306). In December of 1990 Dr.
Charles Smith stated:
[Mr. Smith] is off work at present. He will be off a fairly extended period of time, until
additional appropriate improvement can be achieved. At the present time he does not
appear to need surgical intervention, but may in the future.
(R. 300).
Five different diagnostic imaging procedures indicated a herniated disc and scarring
attributable to surgery arising out of the industrial accident. (R. 422,423,425,426, and 427).
Even Dr. McCann who diagnosed Mr. Smith with depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate
dependancy, and personality disorder indicated that Mr. Smith needs lifting restrictions and
should not have jobs with repetitive motion. (R. 451). The medical panel found:
The physical limitations which limit [Mr. Smith's] work are currently quite severe, at
least partly based on psychological effects.
(R. 76). The medical panel stated that Mr. Smith would need future medical care related to the
injury of May 23, 1990. (R. 75). The medical panel also found that Mr. Smith "has a severe
educational background which will limit the scope of his efforts [with vocational rehabilitation]."
(R. 76).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When the Commission found that a significant permanent back impairment had been
incurred as a result of the industrial accident at issue and that Mr. Smith could not return to his
prior employment of heavy lifting due to that impairment, medical causation had been proved.
Accordingly, the determination of the Industrial Commission as to medical causation must be
reversed.

11

The Industrial Commission's finding of no medical causation rested upon a misreading of
the medical panel's evaluation of the medical aspects of this case, wrongful deferment of the
issues of disability and rehabilitation to the medical panel, and a misunderstanding of the law.
The Industrial Commission reached its conclusion in spite of the fact that the medical panel
specifically found that Mr. Smith's permanent physical impairment was related to the industrial
accident at issue. The Industrial Commission was confused and distracted because of the
medical panel's conclusions as to disability and possible rehabilitation. The commission's
confusion was compounded by a misunderstanding of the law.
Neither the medical panel nor the Industrial Commission are entitled under the Act to
make a determination as to vocational rehabilitation. That determination must be made by the
Department of Rehabilitation Services. Likewise, the Industrial Commission, as well as the ALJ
below, should not have deferred their decision regarding disability to the medical panel. A
decision as to disability must be made by the Industrial Commission.
In order to determine whether a person is disabled, the totality of the circumstances must
be reviewed and the Commission must apply the sequential decision-making analysis as required
by statute.5 The Industrial Commission's erroneous conclusion rests primarily upon a
misunderstanding of the applicable law. A prima facie case of permanent total disability does
not require a showing that the disability is wholly medically caused by a compensable injury,
only that a cause and effect relationship between the injury suffered and the inability to work
5

The sequential decision-making analysis is found at Utah Administrative Code R490-117(D), reproduced in addendum four of applicant's brief, and provides an analysis using specific
considerations the Commission must rely upon and be guided by in making a tentative finding of
permanent total disability.
12

exists. There is actually no dispute in this matter that a great portion of Mr. Smith's physical
impairment is due to the industrial accident. However, the Industrial Commission erroneously
concluded that since there are other reasons which may contribute to Mr. Smith's inability to
work, he should be denied permanent total disability benefits. Such a determination wholly
disregards the sequential decision-making analysis required by statute and the odd lot doctrine as
established by Utah appellate courts.
In its order, the Industrial Commission cites decisions in support of a finding of no
medical causation. However, when the facts of this case are compared with decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court, specifically Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet Mgt. 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986)
and Marshall v. Industrial Comm.. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984), this court must conclude that
medical causation was shown and the matter should be remanded because Mr. Smith's claim was
prematurely terminated.
Permanent impairment alone has never been the sole criterion of permanent disability. In
this case, the Industrial Commission has erred as its conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence. Particularly, the Industrial Commission erroneously relied upon the medical panel.
The medical panel is restricted in its review of this matter to "medical aspects". By deferring to
the medical panel upon the issues of permanent disability as well as possible rehabilitation, the
Industrial Commission erred.
Lastly, the Industrial Commission improperly considered Mr. Smith's pre-existing
condition in its determination as to medical causation. The Commission adopted the medical
panel's finding that Mr. Smith suffered from a pre-existing impairment of his lower back.
Nonetheless, the medical panel did not conclude that the pre-existing impairment was in anyway
13

disabling to Mr. Smith. Accordingly, if the industrial accident was the "last straw" which
rendered Mr. Smith unable to work, then the whole of his disability should be attributable to the
industrial accident. Such conclusion is mandated by Utah law, particularly this court's decision
in Crossland v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 528 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In the final analysis, the Industrial Commission's conclusions are not supported by law.
Where it is found that an industrial injury makes up part of a disability, the claim should go
forward through the sequential decision-making analysis, the Department of Rehabilitation
Services, andfinallya review by the Industrial Commission to determine whether the odd lot
doctrine is applicable. The law mandates this procedure, it was not followed, and therefore the
Industrial Commission must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ESTABLISH A
FURTHER FINDING OF MEDICAL CAUSATION
When the Commission found that a significant permanent back impairment had been

incurred by virtue of the industrial accident at issue and that Mr. Smith could not return to his
prior employment of heavy lifting because of that impairment, medical causation had been
established. To hold otherwise would be in direct conflict with Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet
MgL, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) and Marshall v. Industrial Comm.. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984).
As a result of the Commission's misapplication of the law, Mr. Smith has been substantially
prejudiced and the conclusions of the Industrial Commission must be reversed.
In Hardman. the Industrial Commission denied benefits to a claimant who suffered a
fractured skull when a steel beam fell and struck him on the head. Hardman. 725 P.2d at 1324.
14

Hardman was in his late 50fs, had only a sixth grade education, and had been a manual laborer
most of his life. The claim in Hardman was submitted to a medical panel that found that the
claimant suffered a permanent physical impairment totaling 25%, 10% of which was attributed to
causes other than the industrial accident. JdL at 1324.
Apparently, the Industrial Commission made the same error in Hardman that it made in
the present claim. The Commission failed to distinguish between physical impairment and total
disability. The court noted that the medical panel's rating of his disability reflected only his
physical impairment. The court held:
[The Industrial Commission] did not take into consideration the extent to which his
physical impairment, compounded by other factors, could render him totally disabled.6
Id. at 1325. Further the court explained:
The Commission, by adopting the findings of the medical panel as its own, failed to carry
out its task. It appears to have confused the percentage of impairment, a determination
which the panel is qualified to make, with the percentage of disability, including factors
in addition to the physical impairment, which is the Commission's duty to determine. In
workmans compensation law, the disability is the worker's impairment of earning
capacity.
Id. at 1326. In reversing the Commission's findings, the court noted that the Commission had
failed to acknowledge the odd lot doctrine which had "been repeatedly approved by this court."
Id. In fact, the Hardman court acknowledged:
Numerous other courts applying the odd lot doctrine have found permanent total
disability despite a deceptively low percentage of physical impairment.

6

" [Permanent impairment alone is never the sole or real criterion of permanent disability,
and a denial of permanent total disability based on it alone invites reversal under well-settled
stare decisis." Norton v. Industrial Comm.. 728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986).
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Id. In this case, the physical impairment "is not inconsequential." (Commission Order at R.
125). In fact, the Commission recognized that Mr. Smith can no longer perform the heavy lifting
duties of his job.
In reaching its decision in Hardman, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed its earlier decision
of Marshall v. Industrial Comm., 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). In Marshall, a coal miner sustained
a 10% permanent physical impairment as a result of an industrial accident. That same worker
had suffered a previous physical impairment for a combined impairment of 25%. With nearly
identical reasoning to the present claim, the Administrative Law Judge in Marshall denied
permanent total disability, which the Industrial Commission sustained, upon the basis that the
prime reason for the claimant's unemployment was because of his age rather than his physical
impairment. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that in assessing whether a disability
exists, a constellation of factors must be considered, only one of which is physical impairment.
The other factors are age, education, training and mental capacity. Id at 211. See also
Northwest Carrier v. Industrial Comm.. 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981).
In holding that factors besides physical impairment must be considered in determining
disability the Marshall court applied the odd lot doctrine, explaining:
Under the odd lot doctrine, which is accepted in virtually every jurisdiction, total
disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for
work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well known
branch of the labor market.
Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984) (quoting 2 Larson, The Law of
Workmans' Compensation §57.51 at 10-164.24 (1983)) (emphasis added). A claimant for
workers' compensation falls into the odd lot doctrine when (1) he presents uncontroverted
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evidence of his impairment; (2) he demonstrates his inability to perform the work required by his
job; and (3) in the opinion of the Division of Rehabilitation Services he cannot be rehabilitated.
The odd lot doctrine presupposes that there are other factors, such as age, education, training and
mental capacity, which form a significant basis for the finding of a disability. Therefore, even if
nonindustrial causes contribute to a disability, permanent total disability can still be found.
Therefore, the Industrial Commission as well as the courts must look to the totality of the
circumstances.
Interestingly, Commissioner Carlson in his dissent in the Industrial Commission Order
denying Mr. Smith's motion for review recognized:
In my view, Mr. Smith's injury at work unleashed a cascade of events that has left him
permanently and totally disabled. This opinion is supported by the fact that Mr. Smith
has been awarded Social Security Disability benefits for essentially the same injuries that
are at issue in his Workers' Compensation case.
(R. 127). Commissioner Carlson explained that Mr. Smith's age, education, and level of pain
make it impossible for him to perform the few unskilled light duty jobs he is theoretically
qualified to perform. Id Without using the term, Commissioner Carlson was essentially arguing
that the odd lot doctrine applies to this case.
It is undisputed and uncontroverted that Mr. Smith suffered a permanent impairment from
his industrial accident. (R. 75,125). Further, he has demonstrated his inability to perform the
work required by his job. In fact, the Administrative Law Judge stated: "He will not be able to
return to heavy lifting." (R. 102). Mr. Smith cannot, however, fulfill the third element of the
odd lot doctrine because the Industrial Commission has erroneously held that medical causation
does not exist and therefore Mr. Smith does not have the benefit of the opinion of the Division of
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Rehabilitation Services. The Administrative Law Judge and the medical panel decided on their
own that Mr. Smith could be rehabilitated and retrained for a new type of work. (R. 101). The
Commission then followed this erroneous conclusion. This is clear error according to Hardman.7
The facts of the present matter mandate a finding of medical causation. The facts also
form a prima facie showing of permanent total disability under the sequential decision-making
analysis and the odd lot doctrine. The marshaled evidence in support of the Commission's
findings regarding medical causation is not substantial. To the contrary, the marshaled evidence
overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that medical causation has been shown: Five different
diagnostic imagining procedures indicated a herniated disc and scarring arising out of the
industrial accident, (R. 422,423,425,426, and 427); the great majority of health care providers
who treated Mr. Smith indicated that he needed lifting restrictions and should not have jobs with
repetitive motion; and all health care providers indicated that he had a permanent impairment to
his back arising out of the accident. It is simply uncontroverted that Mr. Smith suffers a
permanent impairment to his back. The only question remaining is whether that impairment
rendered Mr. Smith not amenable to rehabilitation and therefore permanently disabled. The
Industrial Commission simply did not address this question. It ignored the fact that Mr. Smith
suffers from a permanent back impairment.
It is undisputed that the petitioner in fact suffered a compensable injury, which injury is
the subject of this appeal. It is further undisputed that the Social Security Administration has
awarded Robert Smith disability benefits wholly related to the industrial accident at issue.
7

Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet Mgt.. 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986) (holding that
adopting medical panel's conclusions as to disability or rehabilitation constitutes clear error).
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Because the Commission misapplied the law, erroneously applied the facts to the law, and
because the facts as found by the Commission are not supported by substantial evidence, Mr.
Smith was wrongfully denied benefits. Such prejudice mandates reversal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (Supp. 1995).
II.

A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY DOES NOT
REQUIRE A SHOWING THAT THE DISABILITY IS WHOLLY MEDICALLY
CAUSED BY A COMPENSABLE INJURY
By adopting the medical panel report, the Commission found (1) that Mr. Smith had

experienced no problems with his back prior to May 23,1990, (R. 71, 74); (2) that he has a 13%
whole person permanent impairment to his low back, two-thirds of which is attributable to the
industrial injury and characterized by the Commission as "not inconsequential," (R. 125); and (3)
that Mr. Smith's industrial injury to his back contributes to his current disability. (R. 74-76).
The foregoing facts, coupled with the Commission's acknowledgment that Mr. Smith has not
worked since his industrial accident of May 23,1990, makes it obvious the Commission found
that Mr. Smith's pre-existing back problems had been asymptomatic, but are now significant.
In spite of that finding, the Commission somehow concluded that no nexus exists
between the industrial accident, the injury suffered by Mr. Smith, and his claim of disability.
Instead, the Industrial Commission concluded:
[T]he medical panel and other physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent
pattern of non-industrial depression, somataform pain disorder, opiate dependancy,
personality disorder and depression which are diagnosed as the cause of his inability to
return to work.
(R. 125). As a result, the Industrial Commission has rested its denial of workers' compensation
benefits for permanent total disability on the medical panel and other physicians' "diagnosis" as
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to Mr. Smith's inability to return to work. Additionally, the Industrial Commission accepted the
medical panel's conclusion that with adequate conditioning Mr. Smith can perform light duty
work. The Industrial Commission thereafter concluded:
Because medical causation is a prerequisite of an award of benefits, the Industrial
Commission concludes, as did the ALJ, that Mr. Smith's application for permanent total
disability compensation must be denied.
(R. 126). This decision cannot be upheld.
It is simply inconsistent for the Commission to conclude on the one hand that Mr.
Smith's back problems were completely asymptomatic prior to the accident, and further find that
a significant permanent impairment arose out of the industrial accident, and nonetheless conclude
that medical causation is absent. Under the Allen8 analysis, medical causation is required for any
compensable injury. The Commission's conclusion that Mr. Smith's industrial accident was the
medical cause of his temporary total disability, but not his permanent total disability, is illogical
and cannot be sustained. If the industrial injury was the medical cause of Mr. Smith's temporary
total disability, and the same injury forever precludes Mr. Smith from engaging in his previous
employment, medical causation is established.
As the holdings in Hardman and Marshall exhibit, a prima facie case of permanent total
disability does not require a showing that the disability is wholly medically caused by a
compensable injury. The statutory sequential decision-making analysis as well as the odd lot
doctrine highlight that often a disability is caused by many other factors besides physical
impairment. Those other factors, such as age, education, training and mental capacity are often

;

AUen v. Industrial Comm.. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
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not medically related to the industrial accident at all. Nonetheless, those factors are necessary in
making a determination as to disability. Is sum, neither the facts nor the law support the
Commission's findings and conclusions in this matter.
III.

THE COMMISSION MISUNDERSTOOD AND IGNORED THE APPLICABLE
LAW AND IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON THE MEDICAL PANEL

A.

THE CASE LAW CITED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT MATTER
As stated, under the analysis ofHardman and Marshall Mr. Smith did prove medical

causation. The Commission's misunderstanding and misapplication of the law most likely arose
out of a misapprehension of the holdings of this court in Zupon v. Industrial Comm.. 860 P.2d
960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Ortiz v. Industrial Comm.. 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and
Large v. Industrial Comm.. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A careful review of these cases
shows them to be significantly distinguishablefromthe present matter.
Utah law has established that permanent total disability may be denied in circumstances
where a disability is wholly attributable to injuries other than those suffered in an industrial
accident. For example, in Zupon v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), this court was faced with the facts where an electrician felt pain in his back while lifting
an acetylene tank at work. A medical panel found that the claimant had a total physical
impairment of 60%. Specifically, the medical panel found that 10% of this physical impairment
was due to the industrial accident, while the remaining 50% was due to pre-existing
degenerative spinal disease. Two years after the industrial accident, the petitioner applied for
Social Security benefits for total disability, which were granted, not as a result of his back

21

problems, but rather as a result of arthritis in his hands. Approximately 12 years after the
claimant was granted social security benefits, the claimant filed an application for permanent
total disability based upon his previous industrial accident. The court in Zupon sustained the
Commission in denying benefits for permanent total disability on the basis that the medical
condition, arthritic hands, which rendered the claimant unable to work was in noway related to
his industrial accident. Id at 964.
Accordingly, the Zupon case is distinguishable from the present matter because Mr.
Smith is making a claim for permanent total disability based upon the same injury for which he
received three surgeries and was awarded temporary total disability. No substantial and
intervening period of time has elapsed since the accident, and in that short intervening period,
Mr. Smith has not been employed in any way, but instead has continued to suffer from and be
treated for the injuries which occurred at his workplace.
Likewise, in the matter of Ortiz v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 766 P.2d 1092 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), an employee at Kennecott Copper Company injured his back while lifting a
railroad tie at work. He underwent surgery to fuse several discs in his back and later returned to
his employment. Subsequent to the industrial accident, the claimant in Ortiz was involved in two
automobile accidents. Thereafter, the applicant filed a claim with the Industrial Commission
based upon his previous industrial accident claiming permanent total disability. The
Commission held, and this court affirmed, that the claimant's injuries were caused by the
subsequent automobile accidents, not by his previous industrial accident. Obviously, the Ortiz
decision highlights the difference between intervening or alternate causes of a disability, and
those instances where it is undisputed that a compensable injury is at issue. Here, the record
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shows no intervening injuries to have occurred, and the Commission itself found that Mr. Smith
suffers from a permanent low back impairment and was temporarily totally disabled for the exact
same injuries.
Consistent with the Zupon and Ortiz decisions, this court in Large v. Industrial
Commission of Utah. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) was faced with facts where a truck
driver while going through the application process for a job at a trucking company fell from a
truck, allegedly injuring his back. After a long course of treatment, a CT scan of the back was
made to determine the extent of a claimed compressionfractureof the lumbar spine. The
medical testimony found that the compressionfracture"appears to be an old compression
fracture." Based upon this finding, this court held that the fall at the place of employment was
not shown to be the medical cause of any claimed disability. Once again, this court drew a
distinction between an injury and the claimed disability. As to Mr. Smith's claim, however,
there is no dispute that his disability, to a great extent, was caused directly by his industrial
accident. See Medical Panel Report (R. 74,76).
It is important to note that all of these cases, Zupon, Ortiz, and Large, which were cited
by the Commission (R. 125),findtheir genesis in the Utah Supreme Court case of Allen v.
Industrial Comm.. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court was interpreting
Utah Code Ann. § 31-1-45 (1986) which determines whether workers' compensation is
applicable. The court in Allen explained that in order for an injury to be compensable at all,
whether temporarily or permanently, the injury must occur "by accident arising out of or in the
course of employment," and that that phrase required "(1) proof that the injury occurred 'by
accident' and (2) proof of a causal connection between that accident and the activities or
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exertions required in the workplace." Large, 758 P.2d at 956 (quoting Allen v. Industrial
Comm.. 729 P.2d at 18). In analyzing the second requirement of a causal connection, the
Supreme Court in Allen adopted a two part test which requires a claimant to establish both legal
and medical causation. Thus, a correct reading of Allen highlights that the test for medical
causation establishes whether the injury is compensable at all, not whether the resulting disability
is caused solely by the industrial accident. Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm.. 731 P.2d
1079 (Utah 1986).
B.

THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS IGNORE THE SEQUENTIAL
DECISION-MAKING ANALYSIS MANDATED BY STATUTE AS WELL AS
THE ODD LOT DOCTRINE
To sustain the Industrial Commission, the plain language of applicable statutes as well as

other common law laid down by the Utah Supreme Court and accepted by this court would be
ignored. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (1988) provides:
In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes
of this chapter requires a finding by the Commission of total disability, as measured by
the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security
Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The
Commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decisionmaking process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections
404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.9

9

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 was substantially amended effective May 1,1995, and no
longer requires an analysis made pursuant to the sequential decision-making process of the
Social Security Administration. Although it should be noted that the new statute essentially
requires the same analysis. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (b) and (c). In any event, the
statute as it existed at the time of the injury must be applied. See supra note 1.
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The Commission did in fact adopt rules that conform to the Social Security
Administration's sequential decision-making process. Significantly, Utah Administrative Code
R490-1-17(D) states:
To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission shall rely upon
and be guided by the rules of disability determination published by the Social Security
Administration office of disability publication SSA Pub. No.64-014, as amended. In
short, the sequential decision-making process referred to requires a series of questions
and evaluations to be made in sequence. These are:
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal a list of impairments in appendix one of
SSA Pub. No. 64-014?
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her previous work?
Of course, the Commission did not apply R. 490-1-17(D) because it had erroneously concluded
that such analysis was not warranted.
If the legal conclusions of the Industrial Commission are sustained, neither the sequential
decision-making process nor the odd lot doctrine could ever be invoked. If there are other factors
which lead to a conclusion of disability, under the Industrial Commission's analysis, medical
causation cannot be shown. However, the sequential decision-making process is mandated by
statute and the odd lot doctrine is well accepted by Utah appellate decisions.
The correct process and evaluation of Robert Smith's claim was prematurely terminated.
As stated, the Commission erroneously concluded that to make a showing of medial causation
sufficient for a claim of permanent total disability, the petitioner must show that his disability
was wholly caused by the medical condition arising out of the industrial accident at issue. As
explained hereafter, the Commission also erroneously relied on the medical panel's conclusion as
to disability, a conclusion which the panel was not entitled to make under the law. The
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Commission relied upon the medical panel's determination both as to disability and possible
rehabilitation, and by virtue of such reliance, the correct procedure to be followed in this matter
was disregarded.
Further, the Commission erroneously considered pre-existing conditions suffered by Mr.
Smith and further failed to apply the sequential decision-making analysis required by statute or
the odd lot doctrine as established by Utah appellate courts. Accordingly, the present matter
should be remanded for a determination of rehabilitative possibilities, a determination of whether
permanent total disability benefits are applicable under the sequential analysis, and a review by
the Commission as to the possible application of the odd lot doctrine.
C.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON
THE MEDICAL PANEL'S DETERMINATION OF MR. SMITH'S
DISABILITY STATUS
The Industrial Commission in this matter adopted the medical panel's report which

included the "diagnosis" that:
Much of Mr. Smith's inability to return to work stemsfromfactors other than the results
of the injury.
(R. 124). In denying Mr. Smith's claim for permanent total disability, the Industrial Commission
relied upon the medical panel's determination of the cause of Mr. Smith's inability to return to
work. The Industrial Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law must be reversed
because the Industrial Commission erroneously relied upon a medical panel to determine issues
outside of the scope of the panel's authority and also because the findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence.
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The findings of the Commission are not supported by substantial evidence. The
Industrial Commission in its order denying applicant's motion for review stated:
[T]he medical panel and other physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent
pattern of non-industrial depression, somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependancy,
personality disorder and depression which are diagnosed as the cause of his inability to
return to work. For example, after having identified Mr. Smith's industrial accident and
non-industrial impairments, the medical panel concluded that with adequate conditioning,
Mr. Smith can perform light duty work.
(R.125-26). Besides the fact that it is outside the scope of the medical panel's authority to
determine the cause of the disability, or whether Mr. Smith can be rehabilitated, the findings of
fact as stated by the Industrial Commission are not themselves supported by the medical panel's
report. Specifically, the medical panel concluded:
The physical limitations which limit [Mr. Smith's] work are currently quite severe, at
least partly based on psychological effects. He should, however, be able to manage light
duty activities, once he becomes better conditioned for this. His shoulder limitation
should not be restrictive factor beyond limitations because of his back condition. It is
possible the wearing of glasses would increase his capabilities.
The job position shown in paragraph seven and eight of the preliminary findings
of fact have been reviewed. In his current status, and probably at the time they were
offered to him, he does not seem likely to manage those adequately with any degree of
success.
(R. 76). (emphasis added). Thus, at the time Mr. Smith made his claim for disability benefits, he
was not in a condition to perform the light duty work which the Industrial Commission
mistakenly believed that the medical panel indicated that he could do. In any event, that
determination should have been made by the Department of Rehabilitation Services. More
importantly, the medical panel did not diagnose as "the cause of his inability to work" factors
other than the problems with his back. In fact, the report of the medical panel shows that the
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shoulder limitation is not a restrictive factor at all, particularly because of his back condition,
which it is admitted arose out of the industrial accident. (R. 75).
In short, the Industrial Commission ignored the medical panel's report which found
among other things that Mr. Smith has been temporarily and totally disabled for at least a period
of six months after his third surgical intervention and that the medical care received after the
industrial accident was related to that accident. Furthermore, Mr. Smith has a permanent
impairment of 13% to his low back which is a major component of his total impairment. The
Industrial Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law are simply not supported by
substantial evidence. The Industrial Commission cited no evidence other than the medical
panel's report for their conclusions, and as has been shown above, the Industrial Commission
apparently did not review the panel's report accurately.
The Industrial Commission erroneously relied upon the medical panel. Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-77(1) provides for medical panels in workers' compensation cases and provides:
(a) Upon thefilingof a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for death,
arising out of or in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier
denies liability, the Commission may refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the Commission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally
applicable to the medical panel under § 35-2-56.
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical
aspects of a controverted case, the Commission in its sole discretion may employ a
medical director or medical consultant on a full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of
evaluating the medical evidence and advising the Commission with respect to its ultimate
fact finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or a
medical consultant, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and under the
same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(emphasis added). As the statue specifically provides, the scope of review by the medical panel
is limited to "medical aspects." The statute in no wise provides a basis for the medical panel to
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make any determination as to actual disability or rehabilitation. The Commission's reliance
upon the medical panel's determination of Mr. Smith's disability status and possible
rehabilitation is clearly error.
In Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt.. 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986), a claimant applied
for permanent total disability benefits for an industrial injury. A medical panel was appointed
and asked to asses the extent of the claimant's disability and determine whether there was a
causal connection between the injury he sustained and the disability claimed. Just as in the
present case, the panel found that the claimant had been temporarily totally disabled and suffered
from permanent impairment. The claimant was found to have a permanent impairment of 25%,
only 15% of which was directly attributable to the accident. In reviewing Utah Code Ann. §351-67, the Supreme Court of Utah noted that the act itself does not set forth the often
"unquantifiable factors that establish a permanent total disability, even on a tentative basis." Id
at 1325. In criticizing the medical panel's conclusions, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The panel's rating of his disability, however, reflected only his physical impairment. It
did not take into consideration the extent to which his physical impairment, compounded
by other factors, could render him totally disabled.
Id. at 1325. More specifically, the Utah Supreme Court held:
The Commission, by adopting thefindingsof the medical panel as its own, failed to carry
out its task.
Thus, in like fashion, the Industrial Commission in this matter shunned its own responsibilities
and deferred to the medical panel's conclusions as to disability, which were outside the "medical
aspects" the medical panel is statutorily entitled to consider.
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The Industrial Commission in this case also referred to the medical panel's determination
of the possible rehabilitation of Mr. Smith. Such deferment is contrary to Utah law. As the Utah
Supreme Court in Hardman pointed out:
In order for an accurate assessment of his rehabilitation potential to be made, § 35-1-67
requires the Commission to draw upon the expertise of the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation. Once the employee has been referred there upon the Commission's
tentative finding of permanent total disability, the burden is then upon the employee
through his cooperation with the division to establish that he cannot be rehabilitated.
Id. at 1327 (emphasis added). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court in Hardman concluded:
The Administrative Law Judge's substitution of his judgment for the evaluation of the
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation was clearly error. Despite the findings of the
medical panel and despite his own findings that plaintiff suffered from "continuous
headaches, dizziness, [feeling] sick, and occasionally [passing] out," all symptoms that
would diminish one's ability to perform almost any work, he still recommended that
plaintiff look for "jobs such as a service station attendant [or] motel manager." It is not
enough in such a case to allege that work is available; it must be shown that there is
regular, dependable work available for the plaintiff, without the expectation that he will
rely on the sympathy offriendsor his own "super-human efforts."
Id at 1327. In this case, just as in Hardman. the Commission has substituted its judgment, as
well as the medical panel's judgment, for the evaluation of the Division of Rehabilitation
Services.
Not only was the Commission recalcitrant in avoiding its duty to make a determination as
to whether a disability existed and whether rehabilitation was possible, the Commission's
deferment to the medical panel on the issue of rehabilitation runs counter to this court's decision
in Hoskings v. Industrial Comm.. 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In Hoskings. the
Industrial Commission disallowed permanent total disability benefits. The Industrial
Commission had before it a Division of Rehabilitation evaluation that the claimant was not
susceptible to rehabilitation. The Commission also had before it a vocational evaluation which
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had been performed by a private rehabilitation firm. In contrast to the Division of Rehabilitation
Services' evaluation, the private rehabilitation firm concluded that the claimant could be
rehabilitated. Apparently, the Commission found the private rehabilitation firm's report to be
more credible, and denied the claimant benefits based upon that report. This court reversed the
Commission's conclusion on the basis that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 provided that the only
body entitled to inquire into the issue of rehabilitation was the Division of Rehabilitation
Services. This court concluded:
As we read the statute, the Commission was unable to revisit the issue of rehabilitation or
to consider other evidence, such as the [private rehabilitation firm's] report presented by
Salt Lake City Corporation.
Id. at 157. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Commission's conclusion in this matter that
Robert Smith could be rehabilitated must be completely discounted by this court, first because it
relies upon the medical panel which was not competent to make that conclusion, and second it
can be argued that the Commission came to this conclusion itself, which conclusion the
Commission itself is not in power to make under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67.
This court should note that the Hoskings decision, much like the Hardman and Marshall
decisions, supports an award of permanent total disability in this case. In Hoskings, the claimant
injured his ankle in the course of his employment as a fireman in 1980. The claimant underwent
surgery for the ankle condition, but continued to experience pain. Six years later, the claimant
reinjured his left ankle in the course of employment. However, the claimant did not miss any
time from work as a result of the second injury. After the second injury, the claimant
experienced chronic pain and difficulty in walking. Conservative remedies were attempted, but
significant improvement could not be achieved.
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In 1988, the claimant retired to take advantage of an early retirement package. In the
summers of 1990 and 1991, the claimant worked in jobs which consisted of driving a vehicle
from one place to another, making inspections and teaching fire safety procedures. The claimant
reported no difficulties in performing the duties of these subsequent jobs. In 1990, the claimant
filed an application for, among other things, permanent total disability by reason of his ankle
injury. The matter was referred to a medical panel, which found that the origin of the problem
was industrial and that it had worsened since the second accident. Based upon the panel's
finding, the ALJ made a tentative finding of permanent total disability and referred the matter to
the Division of Rehabilitation Services. As previously stated, the matter was also referred to a
private rehabilitation firm.
Upon receiving all of the reports, including the Division of Rehabilitation Services
evaluation that the claimant could not be rehabilitated, the ALJ in Hoskings applied the odd lot
doctrine and found that the claimant had met his burden of proving that the second accident
caused his ankle injury and that he could not return to work as a fire fighter. Next, the ALJ
found that the claimant had met his burden in proving that he could not be rehabilitated. Lastly,
the ALJ concluded that the claimant's employer had not met his burden to show regular, steady
work was nonetheless available to the claimant. As a result of these findings, the ALJ held that
the claimant was entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
The same findings could be found in the present matter. Applying the odd lot doctrine,
Robert Smith has met his burden of proving that the May 23,1990, industrial accident caused the
injury to his back. This is undisputed. Robert Smith has also proved that he could not return to
his work which involved heavy labor. This is undisputed as well. In fact, the ALJ made a
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specific finding that Robert Smith could not resume heavy lifting. (R. 102 at Tf 24). As
previously stated, Robert Smith has been deprived of the possibility of proving that he could not
be rehabilitated because the Industrial Commission refused to refer Mr. Smith to the Division of
Rehabilitation Services. In any event, his employer did not meet its burden of showing regularly
steady work was available which met Mr. Smith's capabilities.
Just as in the Hoskings case, the employer in this case attempted by way of hearsay
evidence to prove that Robert Smith could have received other employment. Recognizing
hearsay problems here, the ALJ only conditionally allowed in records of alternative employment.
(R. 232). However, to find that alternative employment was available to Robert Smith based
upon hearsay alone, constitutes reversible error. The Hoskings court discussed the residuum
rule, providing:
However, the Commission's findings of fact "cannot be based exclusively on hearsay
evidence."Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah
1984) (emphasis on original). To support the Commission's findings, "there must be a
residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a court of law." Hackford v. Industrial
Commission. 11 Utah 2d 312, 315, 358 P.2d 899, 901 (1961)."
Hoskings, 918 P.2d at 155. Accordingly, this court must conclude that the Commission had no
basis to conclude that regular steady work was available to Mr. Smith. This fact is compounded
by the medical panel's own finding that in his current condition, Mr. Smith could not even
perform light duty work. (R. 76).
In reality, the Industrial Commission's conclusions are inconsistent. In the first place, the
Industrial Commission maintains that Mr. Smith has not shown that his disability is medically
caused by the industrial accident. As a basis for this conclusion, the Industrial Commission
states that Mr. Smith could be rehabilitated and was disabled due to factors other than the
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industrial injury. However, to look at the rehabilitation possibilities related to Mr. Smith in a
determination of whether he is disabled at all ignores Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 and places the
cart before the horse. Because the Industrial Commission concluded that medical causation had
not been shown, the Industrial Commission seeks to avoid the necessity of submitting Mr.
Smith's claim to the Division of Rehabilitation Services. However, if the Commission is intent
on relying on possible rehabilitation for the denial of permanent total disability benefits, then the
correct procedure should be followed in that medical causation should be admitted and the matter
submitted to the Division of Rehabilitation Services as the legislature intended.
In short, by deferring to the medical panel's determination which is outside the scope of
"medical aspects", and by failing to seek an evaluation of the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation, the Industrial Commission has acted contrary to law and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
In reality, the present claim is hardly distinguishable from the Hardman and Marshall
matters. When the Industrial Commission found that a significant permanent back impairment
existed which was related to the industrial accident, and that Mr. Smith could not return to his
prior employment of heavy lifting due to that permanent impairment, medical causation has been
proven. Thus, the Industrial Commission's conclusions are not supported by the facts or the law.
Instead, where it is found that an industrial injury makes up part of a disability, the claim should
go forth through the sequential decision-making analysis, the Department of Vocational
Rehabilitation, and the review of whether the odd lot doctrine is applicable. The law simply
mandates this procedure and the Industrial Commission must therefore be reversed. The
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applicant asks that this matter be remanded for a determination of the claim under a correct
application of the law.
DATED AND SIGNED this

IT* day of October, 1996.

DAVID N?MORTENSEN
SHERLYNN W. FENSTERMAKER
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Petitioner
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Petitioner with postage prepaid thereon this \$>- day of October, 1996, to the following:
Richard Sumsion
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
P.O. Box 57929
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0929
Erie Boorman
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611
Allan Hennebold
INDUSTRIAL Commission OF UTAH
160 East 300 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

DAVID N. MORTENSEN
IYIE & YOUNG
Attorney for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM ONE

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 91-644
ROBERT SMITH,
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
*

vs.

AND ORDER
MITY LITE; WORKERS COMPENSA- *
TION FUND OF UTAH; EMPLOYERS' *
REINSURANCE FUND,
*
*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING^

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on May 16,
1994, at 3:00 o' clock p.m.
The hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES;

The applicant, Robert Smith, was present and
represented by Sherlynn Fenstermaker, Attorney at
Law.
The defendant employer, Mity Lite, and its insurer,
the Workers Compensation Fund, were represented by
Suzan Pixton, Attorney at Law, and the successor
attorney is Carrie Taylor.
The defendant, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, was
represented by its Administrator, Erie V. Boorman,
Attorney at Law.

On May 20, 1994, the applicant submitted additional information from Paul Stoneman, a physical therapist, and a report by Dr.
James Adams. The applicant reported that Dr. Adams had been out of
his office due to illness, and was back only on a part-time basis,
and three additional weeks were requested to provide Dr. Adams'
comments to the ALJ. The extension was granted until June 10,
1994.
On June 8, 1994, the applicant submitted the letter from Dr.
Adams. On June 13, 1994, a response to that letter was received
from the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. The case was then
ready for some action to be taken.
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On August 2, 1993, E. Craig McAllister, an attorney who
previously represented the applicant filed a request for attorneys'
fees in the amount of $3,288.20 for benefits generated to date, and
a percent of future permanent partial disability benefits to be
paid out of the applicant's award, pursuant to a contract alleged
between McAllister and the applicant, and the rules of the
Industrial Commission of Utah (IC).
Mr* McAllister alleged that he represented the applicant for
almost two and one half years, or since February 1991. At that
time he indicated that temporary total compensation had been
terminated and that a compensation agreement was offered based on
an insurance company medical examination by Dr. Nord.
The
applicant's treating physician allegedly recommended surgery, said
that the applicant was not stable, and further said that temporary
total compensation should be continued.
An Application for Hearing was filed, and an Answer was
received accepting liability for the recommended surgery and back
temporary total compensation. Mr. McAllister alleged that after
many months of additional effort on the applicant's behalf, the
applicant was given temporary total compensation and a hearing was
not required.
Since then Mr. McAllister says that $16,441 of TTD has been
paid from the period January 25, 1991 to February 14, 1993, when
the benefits were terminated.
He further alleges that the
attorney's fees due on those benefits are $3,288.20.
Mr.
McAllister further alleges that he understands at least $1,846.50
has been withheld from the applicant's benefits for attorney's
fees, and he therefore requests that the $1,846.50 be remitted to
him. This issue will not be resolved until a final order is issued
in this case.
The applicant
Fenstermaker.

is

currently

represented

by

Sherlynn

W.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The applicant, Robert Smith, is 37 years old, and has been
receiving Social Security benefits since April 1991.
He is
classified as a younger individual. A document submitted by the
applicant on June 27, 1994 shows that according to the Social
Security Administration (SSA), Mr. Smith's sole disabling medical
problem is a herniated disc with peridural adhesions, and that his
disability began on May 23, 1990.
2. He is entitled to temporary total disability compensation
at a rate of $274.40 per week.
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3. On the date of the industrial injury, May 23, 1990, the
applicant was working for Mity Lite in a custodian position. He
was attempting to lift a heavy pallet when he hurt his back. He
has had three surgeries, nerve blocks, and cortisone treatments.
He received some relief after his first surgery, but indicates that
his back got "a lot worse." Since the surgery, he has felt "bad"
which is interpreted to mean chronic pain. He has been receiving
morphine sulfate every two to three hours which he says relieves
approximately 50 percent of his pain.
4. The applicant indicates that he can walk some, but he
cannot sit. When he travels by car he has to lay down. He cannot
walk around the block; he cannot sit - so he alternates lying down
and standing. The applicant testified that his pain has been at
the same level for several years.
He says that each week it
appears to get worse.
5. He worked in general labor doing heavy lifting and digging
ditches throughout most of his life. The highest grade he claims
to have completed was the fifth grade.
The SSA says that he
completed the seventh grade. The applicant was forced to leave
school because his mother became ill and died. He cannot write
well; for example, he claims not to be able to fill out an
employment application or to be able to balance his check book.
His wife reads to him. He claims that he cannot do any kind of
work.
6. Most of the applicant's work has been in construction or
other type of low income positions, such as mopping and waxing
floors.
7. A letter dated November 17, 1992, addressed "To Whom It
May Concern" was sent to Mr. Smith. It indicates that Mity Lite
would assist the recovering employee to return to work, even if it
required a light duty position. Mity Lite indicated that three
light duty positions would be available. One light janitorial
position would be sweeping and emptying trash cans with a doctor's
designation of the maximum weight when a trash can was full;
another would be "leg capping" which would be attaching plastic leg
caps on legs before they are attached to a table. This could be
done in a sitting or standing position. The third would be as a
bonding facilitator; this position would include filling one quart
bottles with glue, cutting plastic strips into lengths, and no
heavy lifting would be required. Mr. Smith denies receiving the
letter or even knowing that the light duty positions were
available.
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8.
Mr. Cole, who wrote the letter, indicated that the
duration and intensity of any of these positions could be modified
to ensure that the applicant would not aggravate his back injury.
He would also be allowed to take small frequent breaks to relieve
any work induced stress.
9. Mr. Smith appeared at the hearing pushing a walker in
front of him and groaning. He stood throughout the hearing, and
audibly moaned on occasion. The hearing was recessed at one point
to allow Mr. Smith to lie down.
10.
The medical films were received by the Industrial
Commission of Utah on October 18, 1994. The case was sent to the
medical panel on that date. During review by the medical panel,
the panel found that Mr. Smith had extensive involvement with Dr.
Washburn although he denied having been to a pain clinic.
On
December 5, 1994, the medical panel requested that Mr. Smith supply
records of his involvement with Dr. Washburn.
11. The medical panel completed its report and filed it with
the IC on May 30, 1995. It was mailed to the parties on May 30,
1995 with instructions to reply not later than the close of
business on June 14, 1995 with any objections.
The applicant
replied on June 19, 1995 with a request for clarification from the
medical panel.
The requested clarifications relate to minor
alleged irregularities and would not have caused the medical panel
to reach a different result. On June 22, 1995, the defendant
responded to the request for clarification asking that the request
be denied.
12.
The medical panel was composed of an orthopedist as
member and a neurologist as chair. The panel had a psychiatrist to
evaluate Mr. Smith. The panel concluded that Mr. Smiths current
back problems stem from his low back industrial injury of May 23,
1990 to the extent of approximately two-thirds of his current
physical impairment related to his back. Although he claims to
have been asymptomatic prior to the injury, there were definite
significant radiologic degenerative changes present before the
injury.
13. He has a low back impairment related to his May 23, 1990
injury of 8.7 percent of the whole person. He has additional whole
person impairments of 4.3 percent related to the low back, seven
percent related to the shoulders, and five percent related to his
psychiatric status. These additional problems were found by the
medical panel not to be related to the May 23, 1990 injury.
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14.
His treating physician gave Mr. Smith a 100 percent
disability rating, but it was not done in accordance with the AMA
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th Edition as
modified. It cannot therefore be considered since it provides very
little objective information.
15. Mr. Smith was temporarily and totally disabled subsequent
to May 22, 1990 due to the industrial injury until October 1, 1992.
16. The medical care which has been received by Mr. Smith for
his back after May 22, 1990 has been related to the injury of May
23, 1990.
17. Future medical care related to the injury of May 23, 1990
will likely include infrequent periodic orthopedic follow-up for
counsel for reference to appropriate activities, weight control,
exercise approaches, use of appropriate anti-inflammatory drugs,
and safe pain relieving medications. Further surgery would not
likely produce any additional benefit unless there ware some major
unforeseen future events.
A pain clinic may have merit, if
prescribed, to get him weaned from the use of narcotics. Because
of personality factors, the pain clinic should be strictly for a
limited period of time.
18. Mr. Smith is young, and should be able to manage light
duty or sedentary activities once he becomes better conditioned.
His most restrictive condition will be his back, and his shoulder
limitation should not be a greater limitation than his back.
19. Much of Mr. Smiths current inability to return to work
stems from factors other than the results of the injury. He has a
personality disorder according to both the psychiatrist on the
medical panel (Dr. Burgoyne) and the psychiatrist (Dr. McCann) who
performed the independent medical examination. The personality
disorder preexisted his physical injury. Dr. Burgoyne agreed with
the diagnoses of Dr. McCann.
20. Mr. Smith has demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern
of inconsistencies.
A large portion of his disability is not
caused by objective factors. He has a pattern of exaggerated
physical complaints.
21. Dr. Colledge as well as the psychiatrists found that Mr.
Smith demonstrated somatoform pain complaints. His complaints are
abundantly inconsistent which suggests to the doctors that his
complaints are founded on nonanatomical and nonphysiological
foundations.
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22.
Most of the doctors found that his opiate habit is
excessive given the minimal objective findings and inconsistent
pain behaviors.
23. It is obvious that Mr. Smith sees himself as disabled.
His psychological condition is perpetuated due to the possibility
of financial gain through the workers' compensation system. This
perpetuation is not secondary to the injury, but is related to
social and psychological factors. His disability is secondary to
conversion disorder which is not caused by the industrial injury of
May 23, 1990.
24. It would be appropriate for Mr. Smith to attend a pain
clinic to reduce his need for opiates.
It would then be
appropriate for him to be worked with by the vocational
rehabilitation people to assist him to be retrained for work
commensurate with his physical capabilities. He will not be able
to return to heavy lifting. The employer has shown a willingness
to accommodate Mr. Smith although the positions which it offered
were found not to be appropriate at this time until Mr. Smith is
weaned from his narcotics, and is conditioned for light duty or
sedentary work.
25. The amount of fees claimed by Mr. McAllister must be
reduced by $716.42 since the period of temporary and total
disability has been found by the medical panel to be for a shorted
period than is the period claimed by Mr. McAllister.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Robert Smith is not permanently and totally disabled as a
result of his back injury of May 23, 1990 which occurred on the job
while working for Mity Lite as required by U.C.A. Section 35-1-1 et
sea.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of Robert Smith for
permanent and totally disability compensation based upon his back
injury of May 23, 1990 is denied because of insufficient evidence
to a preponderance as required by U.C.A. Section 35-1-1 et seq.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Robert Smith temporary total
compensation at the rate of $274 per week for 71 weeks for a total
of $19, 454 for temporary total disability during the period May
23, 1990 through October 1, 1992 less any workers' compensation
already paid for this period. These benefits are accrued and shall
be paid in a lump sum with interest of eight percent per annum
commencing effective the date each payment became due.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah pay all medical expenses incurred as a
result of the industrial accident, said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this
Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Robert Smith permanent partial
disability of 8.7 percent of the whole person, or $237 per week for
27.14 weeks, for a total of $6,432.18 less any amount already paid
for permanent partial disability on this claim; said amount is
accrued and is to be paid in a lump sum, plus interest at eight
percent per annum commencing effective November 1, 1992.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to E. Craig McAllister, former
attorney for the Applicant, the sum of $1,130.08, for services
rendered in this matter. Said fees represent a percentage of the
compensation generated, pursuant to Commission rule, have been
withheld from temporary and total disability compensation paid to
the applicant, and shall be remitted directly to Mr. McAllister's
office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mity Lite and/or the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Sherlynn Fenstermaker, attorney
for the Applicant, the sum of $547.19 plus 20 percent of the
interest paid to Mr. Smith, for services rendered in this matter.
Said fees represent a percentage of the compensation generated,
pursuant to Commission rule, shall be deducted from the award to
Mr. Smith, and shall be remitted directly to Ms. Fenstermaker's
office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of
filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response
with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2).
DATED THIS

/ /

day of September 1995.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
° BSrijamin A. Sims
/Administrative Law Judge

MAILING of Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Order
I certify that I have mailed the attached document in the
case of ROBERT SMITH, Case No. 91644, to the following parties
first class prepaid postage on the //^day of Sep 95.
ROBERT SMITH
345 E 200 S
NEPHI

UT 84648

ERIE BOORMAN, Atty,
160 EAST 300 SOUTH PO BOX 146611
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6611
SHERLYNN FENSTERMAKER, Atty,
48 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE P. O. BOX 657
PROVO
UT 84603
CARRIE TAYLOR, Atty,
392 E 6400 S
SLC
UT 84107
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
160 EAST 300 SOUTH THIRD FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH P O BOX 57929
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157-0929

^VMJL

s/^JaAAA^erA. (fir)

June S. Harrison
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Applicant,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

vs.
*
*

MITY LITE, THE WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF
UTAH and THE EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
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Case No. 91-0644

*

Defendants•

Robert Smith asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review
the Administrative Law Judge's denial of Mr. Smith's claim for
permanent total disability compensation under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Is Mr.
compensation?

Smith

entitled

to

permanent

total

disability

FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the record in this matter, the Industrial Commission
makes the following findings of fact:
Mr. Smith is 45 years old and has a fifth grade education. He
has worked as a laborer and custodian. He experienced no problems
with his back until May 23, 1990. On that day, in the course of
his employment as a custodian for Mity Lite, he injured his lower
back while lifting a heavy pallet.
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A few hours after his accident, Mr. Smith went to a hospital
emergency room and was diagnosed with tenderness in the paraspinal
muscles. X-rays taken at the time showed some facet degeneration
and disc space narrowing at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels.
Thereafter, Mr. Smith received continuing medical attention
for his back. An MRI in July 1990 showed bulging discs at the L4-5
level.
His physicians attempted conservative non-surgical
treatment. When that was unsuccessful, he underwent surgery for a
herniated disc in 1991, followed by a second operation in May 1992
and a third in August 1992.
Since his last surgery*, Mr. Smith has reported continuing
pain. He has taken various pain medications, including morphine
sulfate, for the last several years. He has not worked since his
industrial accident of May 23, 1990.
Mr. Smith has been awarded social security disability benefits
as of the date of his accident, based on a finding that he has been
unable to work due to herniated disc with peridural adhesions.
The ALJ appointed a medical panel to consider the medical
issues of Mr. Smith's claim. The panel found Mr. Smith to be in
generally good health, but suffering from a 13% whole person
impairment of his low back, two-thirds of which is attributable to
his industrial injury.
He also suffers a 7% whole person
impairment due to a non-industrial shoulder injury and a 5% whole
person impairment based on his psychiatric status, including
somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder
and depression.
The panel noted that "much of Mr. Smith's
inability to return to work stems from factors other than the
results of the injury". The panel further noted that with better
conditioning, Mr. Smith could return to light duty work.
The
Industrial Commission hereby adopts the medical panel's report.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 35-1-45 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides
medical expenses and compensation to workers injured by accident
arising out of and in the course of their employment. To qualify
for such benefits, the applicant must first establish that an
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accident occurred. The applicant must then establish the existence
of both legal causation and medical causation. Allen v. Industrial
Commission et al.. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
The parties concede that Mr. Smith was involved in an work
related accident on May 23, 1990 and that Mr. Smith has met the
requirement of legal causation.
However, Mr. Smith must also
establish medical causation.
In Align, at page 27, the Utah
Supreme Court defined the test for medical causation as follows:
(Medical causation) requires that the claimant prove the
disability is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related activity. . .
In the event the claimant cannot show a medical causal
connection, compensation should be denied.
In this case, Mr. Smith claims that his accident of May 23,
1990 rendered him permanently and totally disabled.
He must
therefore show that the accident is the medical cause of such
disability. As the Court of Appeals stated in Zupon v. Industrial
Commission. 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah App. 1993):
Proving medical causation between the industrial accident
and the disability for which the claimant seeks
compensation is a necessary component for recovery.
See also Large v. Industrial Comm.. 758 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah App.
1988); Ortiz v. Industrial Comm.. 766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Utah App.
1989) .
In considering the issue of medical causation, the Industrial
Commission notes that the medical panel has found "Mr. Smith to
suffer from a 13% whole person impairment of his lower back, of
which two-thirds is due to his industrial injury. The foregoing
impairment is not inconsequential. However, the medical panel and
other physicians who have examined Mr. Smith find a consistent
pattern of nonindustrial depression, somatoform pain disorder,
opiate dependency, personality disorder and depression which are
diagnosed as the cause of his inability to return to work. For
example, after having identified Mr. Smith's industrial and nonindustrial impairments, the medical panel concluded that with
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adequate conditioning, Mr. Smith can perform light duty work. As
noted at page five of the ALJ's decision, "Mr. Smith has
demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern of inconsistencies. A
large portion of his disability is not caused by objective factors.
He has a pattern of exaggerated physical complaints."
Having considered the medical and other evidence regarding the
relationship between Mr. Smith's industrial accident and his now
claimed permanent total disability, the Industrial Commission
concludes that Mr. Smith has failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that his industrial accident is the medical cause
of his now claimed permanent total disability.
Because medical causation is a prerequisite to an award of
benefits, the Industrial Commission concludes, as did the ALJ, that
Mr. Smith's application for permanent total disability compensation
must be denied.
It is therefore unnecessary to consider the
subsidiary elements of the "sequential decision making process" of
§35-1-67 of the Act.
QEDER
The Industrial Commission affirms the ALJ's order and denies
Mr. Smith's motion for review. It is so ordered.
Dated this

day of May, 1996.

Commissioner
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DISSENT
According to the Industrial Commission's majority decision,
the evidence in this case does not establish that Mr. Smith's
industrial accident caused his permanent total disability.
I
disagree.
The fact that Mr. Smith suffered an industrial accident on May
23, 1990 is admitted. Before the accident, he worked and supported
his family. After the accident, he underwent a series of back
surgeries that have left him in pain and dependant on medications.
Furthermore, he is now 45 years old, has only a fifth grade
education and is functionally illiterate. In this day and age, it
is practically impossible for Mr. Smith to compete with younger,
stronger, healthier workers for the few unskilled light duty jobs
he is theoretically qualified to perform. In my view, Mr. Smith's
injury at work unleashed a cascade of events that has left him
permanently and total disabled. This opinion is supported by the
fact that Mr. Smith has been awarded social security disability
benefits for essentially the same injuries that are at issue in his
workers' compensation case.
I would reverse the decision of the ALJ and grant Mr. Smith
the permanent total disability compensation to which he is entitled
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.

**L
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIOSTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
Order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial
Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 30
days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MATT.TNO
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion
For Review in the matter of Robert W. Smith, Case N o . 91-644 was
mailed first class postage prepaid t h i s y ^ r
day of May, 1996, to
the following:
Robert W. Smith
345 East 200 South
Nephi, Utah 84648
Sherlynn Fenstermaker
Attorney at Law
Ivie & Young
P.O. Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603
Carrie T. Taylor
Attorney at Law
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
P. O Box 57929
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0929
Erie Boorman, Administrator
Employers Reinsurance Fund
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611

ORDER\9I-0644

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Utah Court of Appeals
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JUL 15 1996
Marilyn M. Branch

Robert Smith,

)

Petitioner,

)

V.

oierK OT tne uouii
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW
Case No. 91-0644

;

Mity Lite and/or Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah
and the Employer's Reinsurance
Fund and the Industrial
Commission of Utah,

]

]
COURT OF APPEALS # 960441-CA

Respondent.

Petitioner petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for a Writ of Review
directed to the Respondent in this action, directing the Board of Review to
prepare and transmit the record index in the above-referenced matter.
Petitioner petitions for a Writ of Review and alleges that the
decision of the Board of Review is in error for the following specific
reasons:
(NOTE: Failure to state the specific reasons for your appeal
may result in denial of the petition by the Court.)
(see attached)

(ALSO NOTE: Failure to submit a Docketing Statement within 21
days from the date of filing this petition may result in dismissal
of appeal.)
Dated this 12th day of July, 1996.
/s/Sherlynn White Fenstermaker
David N. Mortensen
Attorneys for Petitioner
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
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SHERLYNN WHITE FENSTERMAKER, #1057
DAVID N. MORTENSEN, #6617
Attorneys for Petitioner
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

ROBERT SMITH,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MITY LITE and/or WORKERS
:
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
and THE EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE:
FUND and THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendants.

CASE NO. 91-0644
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Petitioner, Robert Smith, by and through his counsel
Sherlynn White Fenstermaker, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals
for a Writ of Review directing the respondent Industrial Commission
of Utah to certify its entire record, which shall include all the
proceedings and evidence taken in this matter to this court.
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This
Industrial

petition

seeks

Commission

to review
denying

the entire

petitioner's

Order

of the

Request

for

Reconsideration dated June 10, 1996 as well as the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order of the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims,
Administrative Law Judge dated September 11, 1995, copies of which
are hereto attached.
DATED AND SIGNED this (f~

day of July, 1996.

SHERLYNN W. FENSTEI
DAVID N. MORTENSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Review with postage prepaid
thereon this ?S

day of July, 1996, to the following:

Industrial Commission
160 East 3 00 South, 3rd Floor
PO BOX 146615
SLC UT 84114-6615
Richard Sumsion
Workers Compensation
PO BOX 57929
SLC UT 84157-0929
Erie Boorman
Employer's Reinsurance Fund
160 East 300 South
PO BOX 146611
SLC UT 84114-6611

Paraleqal
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ADDENDUM FOUR

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
In cases of permanent total disability cased by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this
chapter requires a finding by the Commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of
the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The Commission shall adopt rules that conform to
the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 66 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus
$5 for a dependant spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under
Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the
nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent
total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its
insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66,
in excess of the amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation
shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance
carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to
312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation.
Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69.
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extend allowable by law, by the dollar
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the
same period.
(5) A finding by the Commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be
tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally
disabled, the Commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the
employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education for

rehabilitation training, the Commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for the Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use int he
rehabilitation and training of the employee.
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education
certifies to the Commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that
agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the Commission shall, after notice to the parties,
hold a hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the
evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the Commission shall order
that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The
period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled, as determined by the Commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends
with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular,
steady work. In any case, where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's
rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the
award shall be for permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under
this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both
feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members, constitutes total and
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of
permanent total disability si required in any such instance.

R490-1-17. Permanent Total Disability.
A. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of total
disability as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social
Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use
of the term "substance of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its findings relative to
permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code section to eliminate the
requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total disability shall in all cases
be tentative and not final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been accomplished.
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is in
the process of making, a determination of disability under the foregoing process, the Commission
may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf.
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has qualified for Social
Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a significant cause of he disability
is the claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or causes.
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission shall rely
upon and be guided by the rules of disability determination published by the Social Security
Administration Office of Disability publication SSA Pub. No. 64-014, as amended. In short, the
sequential decision-making process referred to requires a series of questions and evaluations to
be made in sequence. These are:
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
2. Does the claimant have a medically sever impairment?
3. Does the sever impairment meet or equal the listed impairments in Appendix 1 of SSA
Pub. No. 64-014?
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her previous work?
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total disability, the applicant shall be referred to
the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation determines that the applicant is unable to do any other work
because of his age, education, and previous work experience, and as a result of an industrial
accident, there shall be a hearing to review the determination of the Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation and any objections thereto, unless the parties waive the right to a hearing.
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the Commission shall issue an
order finding or denying permanent total disability based upon the preponderance of the evidence
and with due consideration of the vocational factors in combination with the residual functional
capacity as detailed in Appendix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014.

